Wide-area control is an effective mean to reduce inter-area oscillations of the bulk power system. Its dependence on communication of remote measurement signals makes the closed-loop system vulnerable to cyber attacks. This paper develops a framework to analyze and quantify resilience of a given wide-area controller under disruptive attacks on certain communication links. Resilience of a given controller is measured in terms of closed-loop eigenvalues under the worst possible attack strategy. The computation of such a resilience metric is challenging especially for large-scale power systems due to the discrete nature of attack strategies. In this paper, we propose an optimization-based formulation and a convex relaxation approach to facilitate the computation. Furthermore, we develop an efficient algorithm for the relaxed problem with guaranteed convergence to identify structural vulnerabilities of the system. Simulations are performed on the IEEE 39bus system to illustrate the proposed resilience analysis and computation framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the power grid increasingly working close to its operation limit, effective damping of inter-area oscillations becomes more important for system stability [1] . Local decentralized controllers, such as power system stabilizers (PSSs), are designed to suppress local oscillations. They may interact in an adverse way, if not carefully tuned, that even aggravates inter-area oscillations. Motivated by the advancement in the Wide-Area Measurement System (WAMS) technology, recent research efforts have been focused on wide-area control (WAC) problems [2] . The goal of WAC is to achieve a better closed-loop performance, such as interarea oscillation damping, by using real-time measurement data from the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) installed across the grid.
One important class of literature on WAC is based on optimal control design with certain performance metrics. The main control objective is inter-area oscillation damping, for which various metrics have been proposed. In the design of supplementary damping controller (SDC) using linear parameter varying (LPV) model [3] , the metric is given by the signal amplification from disturbance to output. To design FACT-based control facilitated by an aggregate model [4] , the metric is defined on the closed-loop transient response of inter-area oscillation modes. A mixed H 2 /H ∞ output feedback control design is studied in [5] where the metric is concerned with geometric measures of modal controllability/observability. Another control objective is voltage stability. For the automatic scheduling and coordination of voltage control devices [6] , the metric is composed of several terms regarding switching cost, penalty on voltage violations, penalty on circular VAR flow, and etc. Typically, these controllers are designed without considering their implications and requirements on the communication infrastructure. Recently, the co-design of WAC and its communication network has been studied. In particular, a sparsity-promoting optimal control scheme is proposed in [7] , where an 1 regulation term is introduced to achieve a good trade-off between the damping performance and the required number of communication channels.
Another body of literature is concerned with delays and failures arising in the communication network of WAMS. To deal with network delays, the damping control design discussed in [8] takes into account a delayed arrival of feedback signals under a predictor-based H ∞ control objective. To counteract the impact of communication failure on control effectiveness, a framework proposed in [9] utilizes a hierarchical set of wide-area measurements for feedback and employs channel switching based on mathematical morphology identification.
Existing works on resilience of WAC are mostly concerned with uncertainties arising in the communication network, such as the failure or delay mentioned above. However, there has been limited discussion on resilience under adversaries. Due to the increasing threat on cyber security [10] , remote signals transmission via communication channels is prone to cyber attacks and resilience problems arise therein. As WAC relies heavily on the availability of remote signals, the integrity of communication network plays a crucial role in the closed-loop performance. In this paper, we formulate and study resilience problems in the context of cyber attacks. Our goal is to develop a framework for the analysis and quantification of resilience under disruptive attacks on the communication network. In particular, we aim to design effective ways to determine whether a given wide-area is resilient, and how resilient it is under certain attack strategy. To achieve this, we use network-reduced linearized power system model under linear feedback control. Such a model is widely used in the literature on WAC problems [3] , [4] , [5] . We propose to quantify resilience of a given WAC as the performance degradation under the worst attack, where the performance is measured by the closed-loop spectral abscissa (the largest real part of eigenvalues). The direct computation of such a resilience metric is challenging for large-scale network due to the combinatorial nature of the attack space. We then propose an equivalent optimizationbased formulation and a convex relaxation approach to facilitate the computation. Furthermore, we develop an efficient numerical algorithm for the relaxed problem with guaranteed convergence. The result of the algorithm not only provides a resilience metric but also reveals structural vulnerabilities of the closed-loop system under the given WAC. The proposed framework is illustrated on the IEEE 39-bus system where simulations under different attack scenarios are presented.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Since wide-area control is regarded as a small signal stability problem, we will use a network-reduced power system model commonly adopted in the literature [11] , [?], [3] , [4] , [5] . The overall power system is represented by an interconnected dynamical system defined on a graph G = (N , E), where N {1, · · · , N } denotes the set of buses and E denotes the set of transmission lines between buses. Let x i (t) ∈ R ni be the state variables associated with bus i. Depending on the level of details used in the generator model, x i can represent generator phase angle, frequency, quadrature-axis internal emf, state variables of Power System Stabilizer (PSS) or other local controllers. Typically, local dynamics and local controllers can be described by linear systems subject to nonlinear coupling terms due to power exchange with neighboring buses. The overall system can be written in the following form:
where A ii ∈ R ni×ni is the system matrix that has incorporated local controls, c i is a constant term regarding mechanical power input, and h(x i , x j ) is a nonlinear function representing the power flow between buses i and j. By linearization at a stationary operating point, we arrive at a distributed control system of the following form:
where with slight abuse of notation, x i represents the deviation from the nominal operating point, A ij captures the linearized coupling between buses i and j (A ij = 0 if there is no coupling), and B i u i is an introduced wide-area control action that reacts to deviations from the nominal operating point based on both local and remote state information. We assume that the wide-area control u i is composed of a local component u i,loc that depends on local state information and a wide-area component u i,wac that depends on remote state information in the following form:
where K ij ∈ R mi×nj , i, j ∈ N are feedback gains. The local component u i,loc is an additional correction on top of PSS, which can be set to zero if there is no such correction. Note that the sparsity pattern of feedback gains captures the structure of communication network. Define n
The overall system can be described byẋ
where
Wide-area control is prone to cyber attacks due to its dependence on remote measurement signals that can be compromised by a malicious adversary. In this paper, we consider the adversary has disruptive resources [10] that can result in unavailability of the signals transmitted over the attacked communication channels. Such an attack model is commonly referred to as Denial of Service (DoS) attack. To launch a DoS attack, the adversary can jam the communication channels, compromise devices and prevent them from sending data, attack the routing protocols, flood network traffic, etc [12] . We represent an attack strategy by α ∈ {0, 1} N ×N where entry α ij = 1 means the channel from subsystem j to i is intact whereas α ij = 0 means it is under attack. By assumption, α ii = 1, ∀i ∈ N . The set of all possible attack strategies is called attack space and defined as A 0 {α ∈ {0, 1} N ×N : α ii = 1, i ∈ N }. The consequence of communication attack is modeled by infinite delay of feedback signal.
We assume that an attack strategy α impacts the wide-area control in the following way:
This corresponds to the case where the controller will ignore the component K ij x j if the measurement signal of x j does not arrive within a certain time period. Such a reaction scheme is natural and commonly used [?]. Now we can write the post-attack closed-loop system under attack strategy α ∈ A 0 asẋ
where K • α [K ij α ij ] 1≤i,j≤N denotes the elementwise multiplication between entries of α (scalar) and subblocks of K (matrix). Define A(α)
A + BK • α. To write the elementwise multiplication • as a matrix multiplication, we consider the following transformation:
Then, K • α =Kα. Furthermore,α can be written as the linear combination of a collection of constant matrices with entries of α as linear coefficients.
Now, the closed-loop system matrix A(α) can be written in the following form that is affine in entries of α.
We consider a wide-area controller to be resilient if it can survive all possible (pure) attack strategies on the communication channel. (4) is stable for all α ∈ A 0 . Conversely, it is called not resilient if there exists an α ∈ A 0 under which system (4) is unstable.
The rest of the paper will focus on the analysis and quantification of the resilience concept given in Definition 1. We first derive conditions for resilience by formulating Lyapunov-based optimization problems. A resilience index is then proposed to quantify how resilient a wide-area controller is to certain attack strategy. To further analyze structural vulnerabilities, we develop a gradient-based algorithm to identify critical channels.
III. RESILIENCE QUANTIFICATION
In this section, we develop a Lyapunov-based framework to quantify the notion of resilience given in Definition 1. The discussion is two-folds: i) We use optimization-based formulation to derive several resilience conditions. ii) We define an optimization-based resilience metric to characterize the degree of resilience for certain attack strategy.
A. Resilience Conditions
A system is stable if and only if all its eigenvalues have negative real part, and conversely is unstable if and only if at least one of its eigenvalues has positive real part. Given a square matrix, we call the maximum among the real part of its eigenvalues the spectral abscissa. One direct approach for resilience condition is to first seek for the attack strategy that results in the largest spectral abscissa of closed-loop system matrix and then determine the sign of the largest spectral abscissa. The direct formulation of resilience condition takes the following form:
If γ * 0 < 0, then wide-area controller K can survive all possible attacks on the communication channels, otherwise it inherits structural vulnerabilities. The optimization problem P0 exhibits several main challenges: i) It is an unsymmetric eigenvalue problem for which the spectral theorem [13] does not apply and thus λ max does not have an explicit expression. ii) The objective is essentially nonconvex due to the maximization of the largest real part of eigenvalues. Typically, eigenvalue optimization problems are formulated as the minimization of the largest eigenvalue or the maximization of the smallest eigenvalue, both of which are convex given that matrices are symmetric. However, this is not the case for P0. iii) The decision variable is binary and not continuous, making the problem combinatorial in nature. To address the above challenges, we next reformulate the problem via Lyapunov stability theory.
1) A Lyapunov Formulation: Recall that the post-attack system (4) is stable if and only if it admits a quadratic Lyapunov function V (x) = x T P x for some P 0. The condition can be written in the form of Semidefinite Programming (SDP): There exists a P 0 0 such that
Conversely, the post-attack system (4) is unstable if and only if for all P 0, we can find a unit direction vector x P ∈ {z : z = 1}, where the subscript emphasizes the dependence of the direction on P , such that
Inspired by the above Lyapunov characterization, we consider the following formulation:
Theorem 1 (Sufficient and Necessary Condition). A controller K is resilient if and only if γ * L0 = −∞, and is not resilient if and only if γ * L0 ≥ 0. Proof. We prove the statement for the "resilient" part from two directions. (⇒): Assume K is resilient. By Definition 1,
we have min P 0 λ max (A(α) T P + P A(α)) = −∞, i.e., A(α) is stable ∀α ∈ A 0 and thus K is resilient. For the "not resilient" part, consider α u ∈ A 0 for which A(α u ) is unstable. For all P 0, ∃x P ∈ {z ∈ R n : z = 1} such that x T P (A(α u ) T P + P A(α u ))x P ≥ 0. By the definition of λ max , λ max (A(α u ) T P + P A(α u )) ≥ x T P (A(α u ) T P + P A(α u ))x P ≥ 0. As this holds for all P 0, min P 0 λ max (A(α u ) T P + P A(α u )) ≥ 0. The rest can be proved by similar arguments as the "resilient" part and for the interest of space we omit here.
2) A Lyapunov Relaxation:
The optimal value of Lya0 provides an equivalent characterization of resilience as proved in Theorem 1. However, the development of efficient algorithm for Lya0 is highly nontrivial due to its binary decision variables and unbounded optimal value. For the practical use, we now consider a relaxation of Lya0 by embedding the binary variables into closed interval [0, 1] and upper bounding the largest eigenvalue of P.S.D. variable. Denote S n the set of symmetric matrices in R n×n . Let A {α ∈ [0, 1] N ×N : α ii = 1, i = 1, · · · , N } and P {P ∈ S n : 0 ≺ P λ P I} for some fixed λ P > 0.
By relaxing the feasible set for the min and constraining the one for the max, LyaP provides a surrogate certificate to Lya0, which leads to a sufficient condition for resilience.
It follows from Theorem 1 that K is resilient. Now assume K is not resilient. By Theorem 1, γ * L0 ≥ 0. Then, γ * LP ≥ γ * L0 ≥ 0. Since the inner problem of LyaP is the minimization of the largest eigenvalue, it can be equivalently formulated in the form of SDP. Let g : A → R be the optimal value of the inner minimization of LyaP:
Consider the following optimization problem.
Note that the first constraint in LyaD is a Bilinear Matrix Inequality (BMI) in decision variables P, α and t. Next, we will show that the dual problem LyaD is equivalent to the primal problem LyaP.
Theorem 3. γ * LD = γ * LP . Proof. Let α * P be the optima of LyaP. Then, γ * LP = g(α * P ) for which there exists P * P ∈ P such that A(α * P ) T P * P + P * P A(α * P ) γ * LP I. Note that the triple (α * P , P * P , γ * LP ) is a feasible solution of LyaD and thus γ * LD ≤ γ * LP . Now consider the BMI constraint of LyaD. For α * P ∈ A, there exists P ∈ P such that A(α * P ) T P + P A(α * P ) γ * LD I. Note that g(α) = min t s.t. A(α) T P +P A(α) tI, P ∈ P. Thus, γ * LD ≥ g(α * P ) = γ * LP .
B. Resilience Index
The conditions derived in Section III-A allow us to determine whether a given wide-area controller is resilient to all possible attack strategies. The next question is when a WAC is resilient (i.e. the corresponding closed-loop system remains stable under all feasible attacks), how to quantify the degree of its resilience. Denoted by r K : A 0 → [0, 1] the resilience index of controller K that maps each feasible attack to number in the interval [0, 1], where the value 0 means not resilient, the value 1 indicates complete resilient (i.e. the performance will not be affected by the attack), and a value in between quantifies how resilient the controller is.
Notice that g given in (8) actually defines a performance metric by the fastest convergence rate of Lyapunov function along the trajectory of A(α). This naturally leads to the following definition of resilience index satisfying condition i) and ii).
Note that r K characterizes the stability degradation of controller K under attack strategies with respect to the nominal condition. The max in the case of g(α) < 0, i.e. α stabilizing, is to account for some poorly designed K's for which losing some links will result in faster convergence.
We can see that the smaller the index r K (α) is, the less resilient controller K is to attack strategy α, or in other words, the more disruption α will incur on K. For the two boundary cases, if r K (α) = 0, K is destabilized by α, while if r K (α) = 1, the performance of K is not affected. Furthermore, resilience index sheds light on structural vulnerabilities of a given WAC controller. Denoted by I(α) {(i, j) : α ij = 0} the attack set under α. We can tell that the channels in I(α) for α's with small index value are critical to K due to the perturbation on which will incur large degradation on stability performance. Our next goal is to efficiently find those critical channels without going through combinatorial search.
IV. A PATH-FOLLOWING PRIMAL-DUAL ALGORITHM
The focus of this section is to solve LyaP. Upon the definition of g given in (8) , LyaP is the maximization of g on the polytope A. Notice that g itself is the optimal value of a minimization problem, for which the cancavity is not guaranteed. As a result, LyaP is not a convex problem. A natural attempt to solve a nonconvex problem is through iterative gradient method and the challenge of which lies in finding the subgradient of the objective function. We derive the expression of the subgradient ∂g in the following lemma.
= 2x * T P * BKM ij x * , where P * min P ∈P λ max (A(α) T P + P A(α)) and x * arg max x =1 x T (A(α) T P * + P * A(α))x.
Proof. Let f α (x, P )
x T (A(α) T P + P A(α))x. Then, g(α) = min P ∈P max x =1 f α (x, P ). Notice that i) x → f α (x, P ) is convex and continuous for each P and ii) P → f α (x, P ) is concave for each x. By the general minimax theorem, the min and the max in the last equation can be swapped, i.e., g(α) = max x =1 min P ∈P f α (x, P ) = max x =1 g x (α), where g x (α) min P ∈P x T (A(α) T P + P A(α))x. Observe that g is the pointwise supremum of g x and g x (α) is convex in α for each x. By the weak rule for pointwise supremum, a subgradient of g at α is any element in ∂g x * (α). Let X * = x * x * T . Note that g x * (α) = 2 trace(P * A(α)X * ) = 2 trace(X * P * (A + 1≤i,j≤N BKM ij α ij )), which is affine in α. Then, ∂ ij g x * (α) = ∇ ij g x * (α) = 2 trace(X * P * BKM ij ).
Notice that the subgradient is obtained in two steps corresponding to the dual update in P and primal update in x. With the explicit construction of ∂g, we are now able to find local optima of LyaP by a gradient ascent algorithm summarized in Algorithm 1. By the property of subgradient, the value of the objective increases at each iteration. In other words, the sequence of optimal values {γ k } k∈N is increasing. By the boundedness of LyaP and monotonicity of {γ k } k∈N , Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge.
Algorithm 1 Primal-dual gradient ascent algorithm 1: Inputs: System matrices: A, B, K 2: Initialize:
P k ← optimality of LyaD with α = α k−1 Update dual P : SDP with LMI constraints 5: x k ← eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of A(α k−1 ) T P k + P k A(α k−1 ), X k ← x k x T k 6:
Update primal α: gradient descent 8: α k ← Π A (α k ) Project α k onto relaxed attack set 9:
In this section, we will illustrate the proposed resilience framework on the IEEE 39-bus system. To obtain the linearized model of the form (3), an object-oriented version of PST has been used [14] . There are N = 10 buses in the network-reduced model where bus 1 represents subtransient salient pole with n 1 = 7 states, bus 2-9 represent subtransient round rotor with n i = 8 states for i = 2, · · · , 9 and bus 10 represents subtransient round rotor with n 10 = 4 states. Each bus from 1-9 has a scalar wide-area control input, i.e. m i = 1, i = 1, · · · , 9 and bus 10 has no control, i.e. m 10 = 0.
The overall system has n = 75 states and m = 9 control inputs. The dimension of system matrices are summarized are follows:
We consider two wide-area controllers K 1 , K 2 ∈ R 9×75 that are relatively centralized compared with the sparsepromoting controller K sp , the value of which can be found in [7] . The spectral abscissas (maximal real part of eigenvalues) of the closed-loop system under the three controllers are summarized in Table I . We can see that K 1 , K 2 have better closed loop performance than K sp due to the former two leverage more remote state information than the latter. However, the better closed-loop performance comes at the price of exposing vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. Next, we will analyze the resilience of K 1 , K 2 under attacks on the communication channels using the proposed framework.
We first give an overview on the resilience of the two controllers. In particular, we enumerate all possible singleand double-channel attack strategies and summarize the worst attack strategy of each scenario in Table II . We can see that K 1 is resilient to all the 81 single-channel attacks among which the worst attack 10→2 still results in negative spectral abscissa -0.17440. On the other hand, K 2 is not resilient to double-channel attack and there are 2 out of 81 attacks that can destabilize the system. Furthermore, neither K 1 nor K 2 is resilient to double-channel attack. But K 1 is relatively more resilient than K 2 as the former has much less number of destabilizing attacks than the latter. Overall, K 1 is more resilient than K 2 . In what follows, we quantify and analyze the resilience of the two controllers by first computing their resilience indices and then identifying critical channels based on the machinery we developed in this paper. 
A. Resilience Index
We compute resilience index of the two controllers r K1 , r K2 under single-and double-channel attack using the definition given in (9) and present them in Fig. 1 . The worst three single-and double-channel attacks, corresponding to the smallest three resilience index, are highlighted by red dots. We can see that resilience index of K 1 is larger than that of K 2 , suggesting K 1 is more resilient than K 2 , as what is expected. This shows our resilience index is an effective metric to quantify resilience.
B. Identification of Critical Channels
We apply Algorithm 1 to check the resilience criterion for the two controllers. The sequences of optimal value are plotted in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(c) . We can see that γ k ↑ 0 in both cases. To identify critical channels, we focus on the optimal relaxed strategy α * obtained at the instance k * when the optimal value firstly reaches 0. We rank the criticality of channels by the magnitude of their corresponding entry of α * , that is the small α * ij is, the more critical channel j → i is. We consider k-channel attacks for k = 1, · · · , 8 generated by the criticality ranking and plot the resulting spectral abscissa in Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 2(d) . The k-th most critical channel is labeled on the red circle for k-channel attack, for which the attacked channels include the its top and those on its left. As we can see that the system is gradually driven more unstable under the attack on more critical channels. Therefore, we successfully identify structural vulnerabilities by the criticality ranking. It is worth mentioning that the exact computation of such ranking involves enumeration of all possible attack strategies, which is computational intractable. Our relaxation approach greatly reduces the complexity. In particular, Algorithm 1 allows us to find a suboptimal ranking in polynomial time.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel framework for resilience analysis and quantification of wide-area control of power systems. We formally define the notion of resilience in the presence of cyber attacks. Resilience conditions are given in terms of Lyapunov-based optimization problems. A resilience index is defined to quantify the degree of resilience. We develop an efficient numerical algorithm to check the proposed resilience criterion and also identify structural vulnerabilities.
